The fall of 2015 saw a sharp rise in student activism across the country in response to state violence against black bodies and systemic racism in higher education. Student protests at the University of Missouri ignited a wave of marches, sit-ins, and other acts at colleges and universities across the nation.
of public policy and structural racism, what can we, as teachers of language and literature-particularly of multi-ethnic literatures of the United States-contribute? What role does the literary classroom serve in this post-Ferguson era for combating racial injustice? What might literary justice look and feel like?
Theories of literature and justice have more traditionally emerged from scholarship on Holocaust literature and trauma studies. In The Juridical Unconscious: Trials and Traumas in the Twentieth Century (2002), for instance, Shoshana Felman examines how the legal language of trials, beginning with Nuremberg, reenacts rather than contains trauma. In contrast to legal discourse, she writes, literature offers "a compelling existential, correlative yet differential dimension of meaning." Literature, in other words, has the potential to offer alternative forms of knowing when other epistemologies fail. This is because, unlike "the language of the law," literature "encapsulates not closure but precisely what in a given legal case refuses to be closed and cannot be closed. It is to this refusal of the trauma to be closed that literature does justice" (8) . I am interested in the ways that literature in the post-Ferguson classroom does justice to this "refusal of the trauma to be closed" and how that refusal might in turn catalyze new epistemologies that "do justice to [racialized] trauma in a way the law does not, or cannot" (8) . The literary classroom can stimulate acts of judging, witnessing, and testifying that reform or even radicalize students' understandings of race and identity in this post-Ferguson moment. "For the justice movement," Claire Guthrie Gastañaga writes, "there is a pre-Ferguson and post-Ferguson," although America's criminal justice system has long proved unjust for many marginalized populations. If we define the post-Ferguson era as one that has graphically exposed the failure of our legal system to achieve or even seek justice-if it has "left the world wondering whether they were watching events unfold in America or under some authoritarian regime" (Gastañaga)-then the literary classroom must bear witness to this failure and provoke students to imagine new frameworks of justice.
To begin this work, many have turned to James Baldwin, and rightfully so. From a packed panel on "James Baldwin after Ferguson" at the 2015 American Literature Association conference; to Michele Elam's stunning keynote address at MELUS 2016 on Baldwin, empathy, and social justice; to any number of resources on teaching Baldwin "as Ferguson [s] eethes" (Lalami) , Baldwin has emerged as the writer to offer guidance at this critical moment. 3 However, I propose two texts that do not seem to speak to this moment-Phillis Wheatley's Poems on Various Subjects, Religious and Moral (1773) and Harriet Jacobs's Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl (1861). Many students find these texts more historically, culturally, and even emotionally distant than Baldwin's works, and therein lies their value as pedagogical tools. Wheatley and Jacobs do not offer the familiarity with our moment that Baldwin does-their works seemingly take place in entirely different worlds. Yet, by evoking powerful affective responses in the classroom-moments of simultaneous identification and disidentification-they reveal troubling historical connections between our world and theirs. Wheatley's neoclassical poems produce a kind of historical vertigo that combats twenty-firstcentury "post-racial" discourses and catalyzes forms of judgment in the classroom that are all too often inhibited by the courtroom. In a similar way, Jacobs evokes a "mourning sickness" that incites acts of testifying and witnessing that open up rather than foreclose the language of trauma. Together, these texts model the kind of work that the post-Ferguson literary classroom can do to confront racial injustice "in a way the law does not, or cannot" (Felman, Juridical 8) . In so doing, Wheatley and Jacobs instruct us on using the literary classroom to supplement, revive, and reframe the work that is done outside of it.
Phillis Wheatley's Front Teeth
Phillis Wheatley seems like an unlikely figure to engender discussions of literary justice in the classroom. After all, her poems and her life are so radically removed from today's college students that it seems difficult to imagine how she could induce sorrow, outrage, or even empathy in modern readers. Many students do not easily connect with the formal neoclassical aesthetics of Wheatley's poetry, nor do they relate to the exceptional life the poet led in the late eighteenth century. Moreover, Wheatley's Poems on Various Subjects upsets many students' expectations of what an African slave who crossed the Middle Passage might write about; indeed, the text does not offer horrific scenes of whippings, rape, and other forms of physical and psychological terror but instead rhyming couplets and obscure classical allusions. Yet perhaps what most disorients students while reading Wheatley is an unexpected identification with the poet, incited by a small, unassuming detail of her extraordinary biography. It is with this detail that I begin class discussions of Wheatley's work in order to prompt students to connect her distant world to ours.
While many details of her life remain unknown, we do know that the girl who would become Phillis Wheatley was taken from somewhere on the Senegambian coast of Africa and brought to North America in 1761. She arrived in Boston, sickly and frail, biographer Vincent Carretta writes, as "a refuse slave, one whose age rendered her of little market value" (Phillis Wheatley 1). According to a letter penned by a member of the Wheatley family, she was "supposed to have been about seven years old, at this time, from the circumstances of shedding her front teeth" (qtd. in emphasis added) . This image of a young girl on a slave ship, losing, or having recently lost, her two front teeth, has always been one of the most arresting details to me in American literary history, and it is one that strikes students in profound ways, too. In many students' minds, slavery is an institution of, by, and for adults, not children-and certainly not children who experience the same benchmarks of growing up as they do. When discussing this detail of Wheatley's biography, I invite students to think about their own experience of losing their first tooth or of what it felt like to be missing both front teeth. Many of them vividly recall this rite of passage, describing scenes with loved ones-usually parents, siblings, or grandparents-who share and celebrate the important occasion; other memories include proudly posing with a lost tooth for a photo to commemorate the event and preparing the tooth and a handwritten note for the tooth fairy.
At first, establishing this connection with Wheatley over a common childhood experience might seem to encourage students to ignore important differences between themselves and the writer, misleading them to conclude that "we're all the same." However, just as quickly as students rattle off fond memories in an attempt to identify with the poet, our discussion sours. "Where were her parents?" students wonder. "Did anyone celebrate with her?" "What did she do with the teeth?" Suddenly, this moment of identification transforms into a disturbing realization of difference. My students' experiences involve family, personal pride, and an evolving sense of self based on their body's changes. Yet they understand that Wheatley's experience was radically unlike their own, not just because of historical and cultural differences but also because of differences in racial identity. 4 All of a sudden, a moment that should theoretically bind them to Wheatley ends up estranging them from her, revealing an abject dissonance in the way that the same rite of passage manifests in two different historical moments. Students begin to understand-and moreover, actually experience-how racial differences can produce vastly different realities.
In this way, Phillis Wheatley's front teeth induce a kind of historical vertigo, a conceptual disorientation or dizziness produced by experiencing time as a series of overlapping yet discrete temporal moments rather than as a linear progression.
5 Because Wheatley's front teeth are both strange and familiar to students, they confuse temporal categories of past and present. This temporal problem, in turn, engenders a kind of cognitive dissonance. As students toggle back and forth between their own experience and Wheatley's, they must think critically and intersectionally about how various dimensions of identity (in this case, race, class, and gender) necessarily encode the same experience in radically different ways. We are, they conclude, not the same, despite any shared experiences, because we do not and cannot embody events in the same way. What seems like an inconsequential, even trivial, detail of Wheatley's story thus incites a conversation about how racial embodiments trigger multiple permutations-or alternate realities-of a seemingly common, unified, or shared moment throughout time. "Phillis is both me and not-me," students say. 6 These instances of vertigo in Wheatley's biography can prime students to begin the complicated work of literary justice in the classroom. In Wheatley's case, alternating experiences of sameness and difference produce new ways of thinking about history and identity. Indeed, in addition to reflecting critically on their identification with Wheatley, students are prompted to examine two facile conceptions of sameness and identity on a broader scale: racial authenticity (sameness within a racialized identity) and color-blindness (sameness between racialized identities). Recognizing the difference between themselves and Wheatley works against the "logic" of current color-blind thinking, a "post-racial" ideology that insidiously perpetuates racial injustice under the guise of racial unity. Color-blind thinking "posit[s] that racism is a thing of the past and that race and racism do not play an important role in current social and economic realities," as Sarah Nilsen and Sarah E. Turner argue (3) (4) ; it thus acts as "a political tool, serving to reify and legitimize racism and protect certain racial privileges by denying and minimizing the effects of systematic and institutionalized racism on racial and ethnic minorities" (4) . This discourse "has become the primary framework for understanding race in the twenty-first century" (Doane 15) , and it informs the attitudes and beliefs of many students who believe that "not seeing race" is a badge of racial progressiveness. A notion of justice in the classroom-literary or otherwisenecessarily depends on dismantling this ideology that erases systems of privilege and oppression. By alternating between intimacy and alienation with Wheatley-"Phillis is both me and not-me"-students discover the limitations of this kind of superficial identification. The vertigo they experience tempers romantic identifications with the poet, thus preventing students from glossing over important details of different lived experiences and espousing pithy sentimentality (at best) or assuming that "we're all the same" (at worst).
Just as her work dismantles ideas of sameness between racialized identities, Wheatley's poems upset another assumption about race that students often bring into the classroom: racial authenticity. As the "mother" of African American literature, many look to Wheatley as the source of authentic black identity and experience. On closer examination, however, Wheatley's poetry models a fragmented racial identity for students, one that is unrecognizable, unfamiliar, and uncomfortable. Other texts in and outside of the African American canon certainly do this, but because Wheatley is considered an origin of African American writing, her resistance to racial authenticity carries significant weight. Perhaps the piece that students react most strongly to is Wheatley's most infamous and anthologized poem, "On Being Brought from Africa to America" (1773), which seemingly celebrates her enslavement:
'TWAS mercy brought me from my Pagan land, Taught my benighted soul to understand That there's a God, that there's a Saviour too: Once I redemption neither sought nor knew. Some view our sable race with scornful eye, "The colour is a diabolic die." Remember, Christians, Negros, black as Cain, May be refin'd, and join th' angelic train. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) U n g e r Supposedly grateful that slavery has redeemed her "benighted soul," Wheatley praises the Christian "mercy" that saved her from her uncivilized "Pagan land." In doing so, she upsets assumptions of racial authority and authenticity in powerful ways for many of today's students who expect her to ventriloquize their own reaction to this historical moment with explicit resistance. "On Being Brought from Africa to America" dramatically frustrates these expectations, however, by characterizing slavery as a benevolent salvation. Indeed, as Henry Louis Gates, Jr. writes, "This, it can be safely said, has been the most reviled poem in African-American literature. To speak in such glowing terms about the 'mercy' manifested by the slave trade was not exactly going to endear Miss Wheatley" to readers (71).
Yet, by ending her verse with the imperative, "Remember, Christians, Negros, black as Cain, / May be refin'd, and join th' angelic train" (7) (8) , Wheatley subverts popular eighteenth-century notions of biological essentialism that dictated that Africans were incapable of achieving Christian grace because of their "inferior" racial status. In this way, the poem subtly undermines the racist discourse it seems to purport, skillfully exposing the religious hypocrisy of the poet's Christian audience. Moreover, Wheatley defies the racism of her contemporary readers, in particular Thomas Jefferson, who famously wrote that he could not consider Wheatley a poet: "Religion indeed has produced a Phyllis Whatley [sic]," he quipped, "but it could not produce a poet. The compositions published under her name are below the dignity of criticism" (140). Yet, by employing neoclassical aesthetics and conventional Western European poetic forms, the poem actually performs the very critique of racial authenticity that it outlines in its last two lines: not only Wheatley's words but also her act of writing confuse eighteenth-century racial categories, demonstrating instead her ability to achieve the poetic conventions of the era. The poem itself, students see, is Wheatley's proof-a literary QED-that deconstructs essentialized racial identities.
In a similar way, Wheatley's famous poem subverts beliefs about racial authenticity in literary reception. The contentious reception of her work across generations exposes differences within contemporary racial categories, as various black writers and scholars-from LeRoi Jones (Amiri Baraka) to June Jordan-have all responded to her in radically different ways. In a 1962 address, for instance, Jones aligned Wheatley with a literary tradition of "agonizing mediocrity" and assimilation (124). He noted that "her pleasant imitations of 18 th century English poetry are far and, finally, ludicrous departures from the huge black voices that splintered Southern nights with their hollers, chants, arwhoolies, and ballits" (125).
7 Finding Wheatley's writing less offensive in 1985, Jordan figured the poet as a metonym of "the difficult miracle of Black poetry in America" who has "persisted for freedom" (185). Bringing these contradictory responses to Wheatley into the classroom radically upsets fallacies of racial authenticity and sameness; students see that there is no "authentic" way to read her work, her representation of racial identity, or her place in literary history. Students are therefore confronted with shifting conceptions of Blackness, demonstrating that identity is anything but easy and homogenous-even for the so-called mother of African American literature.
Disrupting students' assumptions about racial authenticity and color-blindness produces one form of justice in the literary classroom: judgments that result in moments of self-interrogation rather than a verdict of guilty or innocent, as they would in the legal system. By facilitating students' abilities to judge their places within shifting notions of identity, Wheatley's poems offer "outcomes of changed attitudes, improved motives, and better care and justice" (Keen viii) . In practice, her work evokes ethical responses to literature and history by modeling processes of critical reflection on assumptions about one's own identity-what she explicitly calls on students to do in "To the University of Cambridge, in New-England" (1773) . Addressing students at what would become Harvard University, Wheatley writes: "Students, to you 'tis giv'n to scan the heights / Above, to traverse the ethereal space, / And mark the systems of revolving worlds" (7) (8) (9) . Here, Wheatley appeals to her audience by validating their elevated social status; the imagery of "heights / Above," "ethereal space," and "revolving worlds" conjures a superior, celestial position of the young Harvard men. The poem fixes the students in a kind of academic ether, floating high above material reality. To "ground" them, Wheatley compels them to recognize their positions of power. She begins the last stanza by ordering them to "Improve your privileges while they stay, / Ye pupils, and each hour redeem, that bears / Or good or bad report of you to heav'n" (21-23). By "warn[ing] her implicitly complacent students" against moral self-congratulation, Wheatley compels them to take responsibility for their racial privilege (Carretta, Introduction xxi) . Speaking as " [a] n Ethiop" (Wheatley, "To" 28), moreover, she "appropriates the persona of authority or power normally associated with men and social superiors" and uses it to confer a moral and ethical responsibility on those she has positioned as her own pupils (Carretta, Introduction xxi). The poem, in short, demands new ways of thinking based on self-interrogation and judgment; it builds on the affective historical vertigo that students experience in response to Wheatley's biography by engaging them in acts of critical evaluation and reasoning through the study of poetry.
Wheatley's facilitation of these cognitive processes offers the post-Ferguson literary classroom what Felman calls "testimonial teaching." This pedagogy engages students with "information that is dissonant, and not just congruent, with everything that they have learned beforehand" in order to "[foster] the capacity to witness something that may be surprising, cognitively dissonant." In this way, testimonial teaching is "performative, and not just cognitive," because it "strive[s] to produce, and to enable, change"; that is, it encourages students to "transform themselves in function of the newness of that information" ("Education" 53). Wheatley's poems and the details of her biography confront students with dissonant notions of race, authenticity, and identity and then instruct them-just as Wheatley instructs the Harvard students-to resist complacent ways of thinking and being in the world. In so doing, testimonial teaching with Wheatley fosters transformation by enabling students both to judge and witness their place in the long history between themselves and an uncannily familiar poet. 8 Harriet Jacobs's "Mourning Sickness"
If Phillis Wheatley incites new affective and cognitive processes in students that produce self-reflexive acts of judgment, then Harriet Jacobs channels other affects such as sorrow and sickness to engender new forms of witnessing and testifying. Wheatley's estranged familiarity with students induces a historical vertigo, a kind of discombobulation that is productive because of its disorienting effects (or affects). Rather than vertigo, however, Jacobs induces a combination of nausea and sorrow, similar to what Elizabeth Pittman calls "mourning sickness." Pittman identifies this "sickness" in Claudia Rankine's Citizen: An American Lyric (2014) as a physical response to the sorrow, grief, fear, and suffering of black bodies in America. Rankine herself theorizes this mourning sickness when she recalls a friend asserting, "The condition of black life is one of mourning." Rankine explains:
For her, mourning lived in real time inside her and her son's reality: At any moment she might lose her reason for living. Though the white liberal imagination likes to feel temporarily bad about black suffering, there really is no mode of empathy that can replicate the daily strain of knowing that as a black person you can be killed for simply being black: no hands in your pockets, no playing music, no sudden movements, no driving your car, no walking at night, no walking in the day, no turning onto this street, no entering this building, no standing your ground, no standing here, no standing there, no talking back, no playing with toy guns, no living while black.
The power of the Black Lives Matter movement, Rankine goes on to argue, is that it preserves this act of mourning, thus eliciting affects of discomfort, grief, and sorrow at a national level. Jacobs's Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl produces this same "mourning sickness" in powerful ways, thus constructing the postFerguson classroom as a space that also preserves collective acts of mourning. Rather than fueling the ability of the "white liberal imagination . . . to feel temporarily bad about black suffering," Jacobs's mourning sickness instead honors the open nature of trauma-both historical and contemporary-that allows the literary classroom to participate in acts of justice outside the strictures of an impotent legal system.
Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl provokes powerful acts of collective mourning sickness in the classroom, an effect I was intensely reminded of when I last taught the text in the spring of 2016. As my students and I discussed passages explicitly detailing Dr. Flint's sociopathic plan to "to make a lady" of Linda (Jacobs 45), Mrs. Flint's maniacal abuse, and Linda's constrained decision to have children with Mr. Sands, I watched a familiar discomfort grow in students' faces. I had prefaced our discussion by acknowledging my own "mourning sickness," admitting that Linda's story of sexual exploitation "always makes my stomach turn." I theorized that if I verbalized my emotional and physical discomfort, students would be more willing to express their own personal responses to Linda's story. Despite my feeble warning, though, no one spoke. Instead, the class remained silent as we considered Jacobs's famous description of the particularly brutal conditions for women under slavery: "Slavery is terrible for men," she writes, "but it is far more terrible for women. Superadded to the burden common to all, they have wrongs, and sufferings, and mortifications peculiarly their own" (64). As the class continued to grow uneasy-manifested by facial expressions, shifting in seats, and avoiding eye contact with me-their silence firmly persisted.
In the middle of this uncomfortable silence, a somewhat quiet student named Sarah raised her hand to speak. 9 Before I could even call on her, she softly but firmly said, "But it's not fair!" Startled by the simple truth of her comment, I stammered an unsatisfying response: "Well, yes, you're right. None of this is fair." The class then collectively let out something between an exhale and a meditative "hmm"-a quiet assenting noise. Many students nodded in agreement. A few vocalized that they did not think that "any of Linda's story was fair," either. At first, I was confused by their reaction-of course this isn't fair. Then I realized that Sarah's comment had given everyone permission to express this feeling of injustice that had been building over the course of our conversation but that no one had yet been able to articulate. In saying, "But it's not fair," Sarah communicated what students felt but could not say, and, in doing so, provided a cathartic release of the pain and sorrow that had been silently accumulating. I sensed a distinct shift in the class dynamic after she spoke up-once she spoke, others did, too. Her comment had given a language to the difficult emotions the class was struggling with and thus helped everyone bear witness to the injustices of Linda's story. In this way, her words quite literally began our conversation. This is one of the many ways that Jacobs's text is so powerful and, I think, so pedagogically useful: it turns the affect of mourning sickness-a physical discomfort in the face of trauma-into the action of witnessing and testifying. It makes sorrow and grief forward-and outward-looking rather than inward-looking like (white) guilt. Audre Lorde writes that [g] uilt is not a response to anger; it is a response to one's own actions or lack of action. If it leads to change then it can be useful, since it is then no longer guilt but the beginning of knowledge. Yet all too often, guilt is just another name for impotence, for defensiveness destructive of communication; it becomes a device to protect ignorance and the continuation of things the way they are, the ultimate protection for changelessness. (130) For Lorde, guilt is a form of narcissism-an affective response that impedes change. Witnessing and testifying, however, serve as calls to action for justice rather than passive reactions that protect systems of injustice. If we consider witnessing to be, as Felman does, the ability to "speak for . . . and to others" ("Education" 3) and testifying as a "vow to tell," then exclaiming, "But it's not fair!" becomes a discursive speech act that uses "speech as material evidence for truth" (5) . That is, acts of witnessing and testifying in the classroomsuch as Sarah's comment-do not merely speak truth; they produce truth. They materialize truth. Rather than "protect[ing] ignorance," the cry, "But it's not fair!" brings into being the injustice Jacobs endured, allowing the entire class to bear witness to her truth. In turn, using one's voice this way in the classroom serves as "oral resistance to [hegemonic culture's] representations and the marginalization proscribed by mainstream white society" (Fulton xii). As DoVeanna S. Fulton explains, "The tradition of testifying reveals resistance to structures of domination that permeate our lives and how these structures impact people of color. At the same time, testifying presents a paradigmatic critical theory that is relevant to all struggles for social justice" (xii). Sarah's exclamation and the visible and audible assent of her classmates offered not just a moment of resistance to the injustice Jacobs experienced as black and female and slave but also a model for how one might "speak truth to power" in the classroom-how students might collectively resist those racialized and other "structures of domination that permeate our lives." In other words, Sarah's comment modeled for the rest of the class how one might speak (out) in the public sphere against forms of injustice. Indeed, by validating what other students were thinking, Sarah incited others to speak; she spurred them to "vow to tell."
It is easy to romanticize these acts of witnessing and testifying-as though they "fix" or "cure" trauma-and it is easy to gloss over Jacobs's agency, to turn her into an object of pity or sentiment. Indeed, despite good intentions, compassion and its attending sympathies are often destructive, as many scholars have noted. This is especially true in Jacobs's text because, as Elizabeth V. Spelman writes, "feeling for others in their suffering can simply be a way of asserting authority over them to the extent that such feeling leaves no room for them to have a view about what their suffering means, or what the most appropriate response to it is" (356). Spelman here echoes Baldwin's powerful critique that "[s]entimentality, the ostentatious parading of excessive and spurious emotion, is the mark of dishonesty, the inability to feel; the wet eyes of the sentimentalist betray his aversion to experience, his fear of life, his arid heart; and it is always, therefore, the signal of secret and violent inhumanity, the mask of cruelty" ("Everybody's" 12). Baldwin's words in turn reverberate throughout Rankine's reminder that, while "the white liberal imagination likes to feel temporarily bad about black suffering, there really is no mode of empathy that can replicate the daily strain of knowing that as a black person you can be killed for simply being black." Certainly, Jacobs composed Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl in a way to induce sympathy and compassion from northern white women because "[i]nvoking compassion is an important means of trying to direct social, political, and economic resources in one's direction" (Spelman 364 ). Jacobs addresses these intentions explicitly in her preface, stating: "I do earnestly desire to arouse the women of the North to a realizing sense of the condition of two millions of women at the South, still in bondage, suffering what I suffered, and most of them far worse. I want to add my testimony to that of abler pens to convince the people of the Free States what Slavery really is" (5) . In the words of Audre Lorde, Jacobs's strategy may or may not have belonged to the master, but sentiment and compassion were some of the only tools available for Jacobs to architect her audience's responses.
Rather than sympathy or compassion, however, Jacobs elicited a different emotion through Sarah's exclamation: anger. Indeed, witnessing Sarah's verbal protest and how it so radically changed the class dynamic recalled for me Lorde's famous essay on anger, a text that informs my teaching of Jacobs. "Anger," she writes, "is loaded with information and energy" (127). For Lorde, anger catalyzes social justice in a strange alchemy that radically transmutes the very chemistry of reality: "Focused with precision it can become a powerful source of energy serving progress and change. And when I speak of change, I do not mean a simple switch of positions or a temporary lessening of tensions, nor the ability to smile or feel good. I am speaking of a basic and radical alteration in those assumptions underlining our lives." It is, in other words, "a liberating and strengthening act of clarification" (127) and "an important source of empowerment" (130). "Any discussion among women about racism," she affirms, "must include the recognition and the use of anger" (128). In this way, Lorde concludes, anger is necessarily the beginning of addressing racial injustice. Rather than using compassion, sentiment, or sympathy to shut down conversation, Sarah's "But it's not fair!" deployed anger to open up the conversation. Her affect changed the class chemistry. It served as "a powerful source of energy serving progress and change" that compelled a group of silent students to speak. In this way, Sarah's testimony acted as "a liberating and strengthening act of clarification" for the rest of the class, thus offering them a collective and "important source of empowerment."
By expressing anger in this way-as a force that opens conversation rather than forecloses it-Sarah's comment modeled how we might harness the power of testifying and witnessing in the classroom to serve social justice. To do this, however, these acts must be used in the service of honoring and preserving the open-ended nature of trauma rather than attempting to cure or heal it. Although witnessing might seem to facilitate the healing process, Felman insists that it is instead "a philosophical and ethical correlative of a situation with no cure, and of a radical human condition of exposure and vulnerability." She frames testimony and testifying in similar ways: "What the testimony does not offer is, however, a completed statement, a totalizable account of those events. In the testimony, language is in process and in trial, it does not possess itself as a conclusion, as the constatation of a verdict or the self-transparency of knowledge" ("Education" 5). Sarah's comment did not "cure" or offer "a completed statement" for Jacobs's injustice; instead, her cry of outrage-"But it's not fair!"-acknowledged the "radical human condition of exposure and vulnerability."
To be sure, Sarah exercised her privilege by being able to speak in this way. As a white, cisgender, formally educated college student in the twenty-first century, she bears significant differences from Jacobs. Yet a serendipitous moment of identification complicated the vast metaphysical space between the two women. Immediately after she made her comment in class, Sarah fell quiet; visibly upset, she clutched the hand of a friend sitting next to her for the rest of class. In an email from Sarah that night, I learned that she had recently survived a sexual assault. "I apologize for possibly looking disinterested or upset even in class today," she wrote me, I guess I didn't realize how hard it would be talking about that subject, especially after it was already not very easy reading about it. The topic is extremely touchy for me, I almost had to walk about [sic] of class completely. I was sexually assaulted just over a year ago and I have to live with the consequences of it every day. I just wanted to apologize again for any coldness or disinterest, it was just not easy for me to be there today. ("Apologies"; emphasis added) 10 Although Sarah readily gave our class language to address the injustice in Jacob's narrative, she shifted uncomfortably from one euphemism to another in her email: that subject, it, that topic. Several days later, she came to my office to discuss an assignment but soon began talking about her feelings during the class discussion of Jacobs. During our conversation, she described a familiar experience-a kind of "Linda is both me and not-me" feeling-that echoed the class's reaction to Wheatley a few weeks prior. Just as the class felt disoriented by a parallel identification with and alienation from Wheatley, Sarah described a similar vertiginous response to Jacobs-but one that, in addition to dizziness, produced anger and symptoms of "mourning sickness" such as nausea and sorrow.
Of course, Sarah's classroom comment and her ensuing disclosure to me could not have been planned. Yet these unsettling moments in and outside of the classroom led me to reflect on the pedagogical potential of Jacobs's narrative, like that of Wheatley's poems, to induce affects that bear witness to historical and personal traumas. When I facilitate discussions about Jacobs's Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl in the future, I will use readings such as Baldwin's on sentiment and Lorde's on anger to prompt students to reflect on their affective responses in the classroom-anger, nausea, sorrow, discomfort. In doing so, I wish for students to meditate on these complex feelings as a way of preserving, witnessing, and testifying to Jacobs's trauma. I hope to incite a conversation about how Jacobs disrupts our security and comfort in the current moment just as she did for her original readers. Moreover, I want students to link this affective response to literary form, specifically Jacobs's powerful refusal of narrative closure. "The dream of my life is not yet realized," she writes, subverting the standard norms of the sentimental narrative:
I do not sit with my children in a home of my own. I still long for a hearthstone of my own, however humble. . . . It has been painful to me, in many ways, to recall the dreary years I passed in bondage. I would gladly forget them if I could. Yet the retrospection is not altogether without solace; for with those gloomy recollections come tender memories of my good old grandmother, like light fleecy clouds floating over a dark and troubled sea. (156) Jacobs's haunting ending is jarring and uneasy-it refuses to close the narrative, to heal the wound her words have ripped open in the reader's consciousness. It agitates and unsettles. It is, in Felman's words, "a situation with no cure"; "it does not possess itself as a conclusion" ("Education" 5).
By constructing a literary classroom that honors the open-endedness of Jacobs's narrative and of trauma more generally, we can offer language that acknowledges trauma's truth and confirms that it matters in ways that the legal system cannot and does not validate. In the end, what was perhaps most powerful about Sarah's response to Jacobs was that, rather than dismissing their responses, her outcry "return [ed] " to the rest of the class their own "expressions of their shock, their trauma and their disarray" (Felman, "Education" 54) . In this way, Sarah also acted as a witness to the class's uneasy feelings, testifying to and affirming "the important fact that their experience, incoherent though it seemed, made sense, and that it mattered" (54-55). She thus provided "an affirmation of the double fact that their response was meaningful, and that it counted" (55). Literary justice in the post-Ferguson classroom does not mean healing traumatic instances of injustice, racial or otherwise, with sentiment and sympathy. However, it can mean-through the acts of witnessing and testifying-the possibility of affirming and honoring the symptoms of mourning sickness that are meaningful and that do count. Affirming this kind of mourning sickness allows us to link the literary texts of Wheatley and Jacobs to today's climate of increasing mass student protest. Only by contextualizing these texts and the responses they induce do we as educators begin to approach a kind of literary justice in the post-Ferguson classroom. Indeed, "It is the teacher's task to recontextualize the crisis and to put it back into perspective," Felman writes, "to relate the present to the past and to the future and to thus reintegrate the crisis in a transformed frame of meaning" ("Education" 54). To be sure, Wheatley and Jacobs allow us to open up rather than close down meaning-they refuse to foreclose or to fix racial authenticity and acts of mourning sickness. In this way, they open the possibility in the classroom of relating "the present to the past and to the future." By disabusing students of their assumptions about racial authenticity and sameness, and by engaging them in acts of witnessing and testifying, Wheatley and Jacobs offer us the ability to "reintegrate" modern crises "in a transformed frame of meaning." The racial injustices these writers document may seem historically irrelevant to students, but, because they are unsettled and open-ended, they provide a conduit to today's classroom. Ferguson only makes sense if we acknowledge that the racial injustice that Wheatley and Jacobs portray remains open-that it has never healed. If we close down the injustices in their work-if we, as teachers, imply to our students that these traumas have been "resolved"-then Ferguson does not make sense as a historical reality because the injustices that plagued the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries should have been "fixed." However, if we acknowledge that the traumas were never resolved, never cured, never fixed, never healed, never contained, then we understand how Ferguson happenedwe can transform students' "frame of meaning." In other words, the dissonant knowledge about racial identity that Wheatley and Jacobs produce for our students opens up epistemological pathways to contemporary understandings of racial injustice. They have the potential to do this both for students who are well aware-personally and otherwise-of contemporary forms of racial prejudice and for students who are perhaps thinking of these connections for the first time. In both instances, what matters is the realization that, as an exasperated student recently said to me, "this has all happened before." In this way, then, the post-Ferguson classroom arms students with a longer historical lens, revealing to them that, as citizens of a nation founded on racial injustice and trauma, we have always been living in a "post-Ferguson" moment.
Using Wheatley and Jacobs produces a useful pedagogical model for teaching connections between historical moments: the palimpsest. Using a timeline allows students to perceive literary history as a series of dialectical reversals (for example, realism is a reaction to romanticism) that can be useful in highlighting various historical causes and effects. However, a palimpsest-a series of layers that connect certain moments, themes, and experiences, past and present-allows students to see connections, echoes, and hauntings between various historical periods. These are moments, symbols, words, objects that "bleed" through the layers of history-that reappear, like Toni Morrison's character, Beloved, to remind us that the past is always present. As Ralph Ellison has also reminded us, "what is commonly assumed to be past history is actually as much a part of the living present as William Faulkner insisted. Furtive, implacable and tricky, it inspirits both the observer and the scene observed, artifacts, manners and atmosphere and it speaks even when no one wills to listen" (xvi). Similar to Sethe's "rememory" in Beloved (1987) , conceiving literary history as a palimpsest-as a series of connections between present and past-allows students to theorize the nearness of history. "I was talking about time," Sethe tells Denver. "It's so hard for me to believe in it. Some things go. Pass on. Some things just stay. I used to think it was my rememory. You know. Some things you forget. Other things you never do" . As students connect previous injustices through the palimpsest of American literary history to the present moment, they enact this rememory, excavating the residue and pain of past eras that remain with us today. After all, as Amy contemplates while rubbing Sethe's swollen, bloody feet, "Anything dead coming back to life hurts" (35).
Indeed, it is this persistent immediacy of mourning and injustice that Rankine finds so powerful about contemporary social justice movements. For her, Black Lives Matter serves as an attempt to keep mourning an open dynamic in our culture because black lives exist in a state of precariousness. Mourning then bears both the vulnerability inherent in black lives and the instability regarding a future for those lives. Unlike earlier black-power movements that tried to fight or segregate for self-preservation, Black Lives Matter aligns with the dead, continues the mourning and refuses the forgetting in front of all of us.
By linking Wheatley and Jacobs to contemporary efforts outside the classroom that preserve the "precariousness," "vulnerability," and "instability" of black lives, we can use the literary classroom to "refus[e] the forgetting in front of all of us." In this way, we can "reintegrate the crisis" of racial injustice "in a transformed frame of meaning" (Felman, "Education" 54) to produce some sense of justice at a moment when the courtrooms do not, cannot, and will not.
In the process of using Wheatley and Jacobs to recontextualize racial injustice, however, it is imperative that we do so in a self-critical way by acknowledging the labor that these black bodies-both the women themselves and their body of work-do for our classrooms. 11 The issue of placing the burden of explanation and education on women writers of color must be part of the conversation in the classroom, too, otherwise discussions of Wheatley and Jacobs risk becoming yet more instances of black writers having to teach white students (at least at my institution) how not to be racist. That is not their job. Yet black women writers and their works are recruited to do so again and again, often only valued for this kind of emotional labor. June Jordan, for example, diagnoses the real work Phillis performed for John and Susanna Wheatley:
Seven year old Phillis changed the slaveholding Wheatleys. She altered their minds. She entered their hearts. She made them see her and when they truly saw her, Phillis, darkly amazing them with the sweetness of her spirit and the alacrity of her forbidden, strange intelligence, they, in their own way, loved her as a prodigy, as a girl mysterious but godly. (176) Jordan's bitter assessment of the role Wheatley played for her white masters is sobering testimony to bring into the classroom, as is Zora Neale Hurston's analysis-via Janie's grandmother in Their Eyes Were Watching God (1937)-that the black woman is "de mule uh de world" (14) . Prompting students to consider how this use of black female creative labor might continue to this day-in discussions of Wheatley and Jacobs, or even of contemporary figures such as Beyoncé-opens up necessary conversations of critical self-awareness. Any conversation that does not address the work done by black women writers risks reproducing the very devaluation of black labor that pedagogies of literary justice must confront.
By facilitating such models of critical self-awareness, the post-Ferguson classroom ultimately fosters discomfort. Attending to the kinds of exploitation, trauma, and injustice that Wheatley and Jacobs document will necessarily make many students, and even many educators, uncomfortable. Indeed, the discomfort and unease that both writers produce might thus be considered the defining affects (and effects) of the literary justice classroom. As bell hooks writes, "exposing certain truths and biases in the classroom often create[s] chaos and confusion," so " [t] he idea that the classroom should always be a 'safe,' harmonious place" is naïve and facile, even harmful (Teaching to Transgress 30). 12 Yet this tension is both endemic to and the reward of testimonial teaching: "The purpose of education, finally," Baldwin writes, "is to create in a person the ability to look at the world for himself, to make his own decisions, to say to himself this is black or this is white, to decide for himself whether there is a God in heaven or not" ("Talk" 678). However, he continues, "no society is really anxious to have that kind of person around. What societies really, ideally, want is a citizenry which will simply obey the rules of society" (679). Democratic education is uncomfortable and thus dangerous, Baldwin attests, because it interrogates a reality so normalized that to question it feels criminal. In the contemporary moment, TaNehisi Coates echoes Baldwin's remarks, crediting his education at Howard University for catalyzing his own "transformed frame of meaning" (Felman, "Education" 54) : "It began to strike me that the point of my education was a kind of discomfort, was the process that would not award me my own especial
Dream but would break all the dreams, all the comforting myths of Africa, of America, and everywhere, and would leave me only with humanity in all its terribleness" (Coates 52). Here, Coates testifies to the power of education to help him abandon "all the comforting myths," which in turn allows him, finally, to confront the trauma of history.
Education that fosters dissonant conceptions of racial identity produces "a transformed frame of meaning" (Felman, "Education" 54) and constructs an epistemological bridge between historical and contemporary racial injustices-just as Wheatley and Jacobs do-that offers the promise of creating a citizenry that will not "simply obey" (Baldwin, "Talk" 679) , one that will not buy and sell "all the comforting myths" (Coates 52), and thus "refuses the forgetting in front of all of us" (Rankine). Wheatley and Jacobs give us the feelings and the language to enact this refusal. Their instruction is the reward-it is the justice-of the post-Ferguson literary classroom when those courtrooms from Ferguson to Cleveland to Waller County to Baltimore fall silent.
Notes
I would like to thank the students in my African American Literature course of spring 2016, the students of Ripon College's Black Student Union, and the participants of two thought-provoking panels at the 2016 annual MELUS conference-"Brown Girls Dreaming and Grieving" and "Harriet Jacobs and the Slave Narrative Tradition"-for difficult yet enriching conversations that informed the ideas in this paper.
1. For brief overviews of this student activity, see Madison Pauly and Becca Andrews as well as Anemona Hartocollis and Jess Bidgood. Since the fall of 2015, this trend of political activism on campuses has continued, and a recent UCLA survey "found students' interest in political engagement at historically high levels." A recent Washington Post article suggests that this is "yet another sign that many students are not waiting for social change-they are forcing it to happen, campus by campus" (Svrluga) . 2. Here I am referring to the failure of the justice system to hold anyone accountable for the deaths of Michael Brown (Ferguson), Tamir Rice (Cleveland), Sandra Bland (Waller County, Texas), and Freddie Gray (Baltimore). Recently, the city of Cleveland announced it had reached a six-million-dollar settlement with Rice's family, although it admitted no wrongdoing. This is similar to settlements with other families of victims of police brutality, including Bland, Gray, and Eric Garner. Since the inception of this article, there have been countless other examples of this systemic failure, including the June 2017 acquittal of the officer who shot and killed Philando Castile during a traffic stop in the suburbs of St. Paul, Minnesota, in July of 2016.
experience often leads caring professors to feel cynical about any effort to intervene in the dominator context and engage students with care. Serving students well is an act of critical resistance. It is political. And therefore it will not yield the normal rewards provided when we are simply perpetuating the status quo. (Teaching Community 89-90)
Baldwin similarly writes: "[Y]ou must understand that in the attempt to correct so many generations of bad faith and cruelty, when it is operating not only in the classroom but in society, you will meet the most fantastic, the most brutal, and the most determined resistance. There is no point in pretending that this won't happen" ("Talk" 678).
